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CFR contracts ^ the test ofconforming documents
The buyers also attempted to justify their refusal to pay on the ground that they were entitled to
reject the documents.The argument focused particularly on the bill of lading document where the
Intan 6 was named as the first carrying vessel.That fact alone, the buyers argued, was sufficient to
condemn the bill of lading as a non-conforming document, essentially because the ship was not
contractual.
The court rejected the argument as far too wide.The court indicated that the t`est is whether the
documents contain a statement or statements which, without further investigation, demonstrates
that the contract has not been honoured in one or more respects of more than minimal
importance. This point must be apparent from the terms of the documents themselves, without
enquiry into the physical performance of the contract'.
Subject to the issue of fraud, documents are non-conforming if theydo notconformwith the express
stipulations of the sale contract, or if they are not genuine, in the sense that they contain false
information. In the present case the bill of lading was clearly genuine and on its face it also
accurately identified the carrying ship as Intan 6.Viewed in this manner, there was nothing about
the bill of lading that indicated that the contract was not being properly performed, and there was
no obligation to dig any deeper into the actual performance of the contract.
DRT
DOCUMENTARYCREDITS AND ILLEGALITY IN THE UNDERLYING TRANSACTION
Mahonia Limited v JPMorgan Chase Bank
English Commercial Court [2003] EWHC1927 (Comm)
Facts
An interlocutory applicationwasmade on assumed facts.
In 2001,Mahonia,Chase Bank and a subsidiary of Enron entered into three swap transactions.Under
those transactions, Mahonia lent Enron through Chase's intermediation a sum of about US$50
million. The sum was to be repaid with interest in six months after drawdown. Repayment was
agreed to be partly secured by the issue of a letter of credit by West LB AG at the application of
Enron for the benefit of Mahonia. The overall effect of the three swaps was that Enron was to
receive the use of US$350 million for six months. It was contended by West LB that the transaction
was purely a cosmetic scheme to provide Enronwith a loan of US$350 million at a rate of interest of
roughly 3.4 per cent per annumwhich Enron did not have to record in its accounts as a debt. Enron
also paid Chase an arrangement fee of US$1million.
Enron defaulted on the repayment and Mahonia thusmade a demand onWest LB on the basis of the
letter of credit.Thebank refused topay arguing that the letter of creditwas taintedby illegality as the
letter of credit was arranged to enable Enron to commit an accounting offence under US securities
law and as such,wasunenforceable ongrounds of public policy.West LB claimed that itwas not aware
of the illegal nature of the underlying transactions until after the claim for payment under the letter
of credit was made. They were therefore not privy to the illegality and was not prevented from
relying on the illegality defence.
The question for the court was whether the principle of autonomy required the bank to disregard
the illegality under foreign law and pay according to the terms of the credit.
Decision
The court supported the bank's argument that the illegality affected not only the underlying
transactions but also the letter of credit. Colman J found that the letter of credit was an essential
requirement of Chase in order to set up the cosmetic scheme; it was therefore not divisible from
518 JIML 9 [2003] 6 : ANALYSIS ANDCOMMENT
the underlying transactions. Not only the three swaps but also the letter of credit must be said to
have an illegal purpose in asmuch asboth the swaps and the letter of creditwere entered into for the
purpose of providing the structure onwhich Enron'smisleading accounts were to be founded.
The courtwenton to hold that itdidnotmatter that the illegality wasunder a foreign lawor that the
illegality was known only to one party. As Colman J said:
Itmust logically be just as contrary to public policy to enable the claimant to enforce a contract which
has been entered into for a foreign illegal purpose known only to himself as to enable him to enforce
such a contract the purpose of which is known to both parties.
Comment
This is yet another case in very recent times permitting the derogation from the principle of
autonomy in documentary credit. It is on the whole a moral decision but moral decisions often may
not always sitwellwith theparadigms of commercial certainty.Cases on illegality and letters of credit
are few, themain one being Group Josi vWalbrook Insurance Co Ltd & others [1996] 1Lloyd's Rep 345.
This case is important in offering guidance on the extent to which illegality might be compared to
fraud as an exception to the principle of autonomy. It may be recalled that Lord Diplock in United
City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada [1983] 1AC168 took care in stressing that
fraudby the beneficiary was only one e`stablished exception' to the principle that the bank's duty was
to pay againstdocumentswhich on their face conformedwith therequirements of the letter of credit
and without reference to any challenge to those documents arising from disputes between the
applicant and the beneficiary. Hence, the first hurdle for the bank in the present case was to show
that it was not contrary to principle to rely on the illegal purpose for which the letter of credit was
obtained as a defence against a demand for payment. In the present case,Colman J did not consider
thatplain emphasis of LordDiplock a rejection of illegality as a defence.The judge reasoned that Lord
Diplock's explanation for the fraud exception, by reference to the general maxim that the court
should not permit the use of their process by a dishonest person to carry out a fraud strongly
indicated that illegality should similarly be admitted as a defence.
There is however an aspect which the court did not quite consider: in fraud cases, the fraud is
normally practised on the applicant and/or the bank. In cases where the underlying transaction is
said to be illegal, the illegality is likely not practised on either the applicant or the bank. It would
appear that, as far as the court was concerned, that was immaterial. So long as an offence (be it
under English or foreign law) is to be committed through the use of the letter of credit, it must
prevent the beneficiary from benefiting from it as long as the beneficiary was a participant in the
offence and the bank had no prior notice of the illegality. It is clear that this reliance on the public
policy rule that a dishonest person should not benefit from his crime is to ensure that beneficiaries
are suitablydeterred.There is however no emphasis on thebank's role in all this ^ it is notrequired to
make inquiries into the purpose of the application for the letter of credit. Even where the unusual
nature of the terms of the letter of credit might have put the bank on enquiry that something may
not be entirely right, there is nothing to prevent the bank from refusing to pay. For even where the
bank is fully complicit in the illegality, on the basis of ex turpi causa the beneficiary need not be paid.
The analogymade with fraudmeans that before the defence of illegality can be relied on, it must be
shown that the beneficiary was privy to the illegality and, secondly, that it is not enough for the bank
to claim that it has suspicions that the underlying transactionwas illegal. Itmust be able to show that
the bank hadmore than mere suspicion and that not only was the underlying transaction illegal but
the letter of creditwas central to achieving the illegal purpose or cannotbe separated from the illegal
purpose.
InGroup Josi, J, a reinsurer, agreedwithWthat the latterwouldpayover to themcertain loss reserves
in exchange for a letter of credit under whichWwould be entitled to draw down against debit notes
stating that J was liable for the amounts in question. J brought proceedings to prevent W from
drawing down under the letter of credit. It argued that it was not properly authorised under the
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Insurance Companies Act1982 to carry on insurance business in Great Britain and as the contracts
weremade in the jurisdiction, they and the letter of credit were illegal and unenforceable.Clarke J at
first instance held that the letter of credit was not tainted by the illegality (if proved) not only
because it represented a contract separate from the underlying reinsurance contracts, it was a
mere facility provided subsequently to the entering into of the illegal reinsurance contracts which
assisted performance in a manner not specifically rendered illegal.Where, on the other hand, the
letter of credit plays from the outset an integral part in the illegal transaction, the letter of credit
could not and should not be enforced.
Staughton LJ inGroup Josi gave the following as anexample ofwhen the letterof creditwas deemed to
be an integral part of the underlying transaction:
It seems to me that theremust be cases when illegality can affect a letter of credit.Take for example a
contract for the sale of arms to Iraq, at a timewhen such a sale is illegal.The contract provides for the
opening of a letter of credit, to operate on presentation of a bill of lading for1,000 kalashnikov rifles to
be carried to the port of Basra. I do not suppose that a court would give judgment for the beneficiary
against the bank in such a case.
Staughton LJ went on to state, in passing, that if the reinsurance contracts were illegal and if the
letter of credit was used as a means of paying sums due under those illegal contracts, the court
would restrain the bank from making payment to the beneficiary. That would not be because the
letter of credit contract was itself illegal but because it was being used to carry out an illegal
transaction.This reversal of Clarke J's finding demonstrates starkly that, in commercial law, it is only
in very rare situations that the letter of credit would not be found to play an integral part in the
underlying transaction. Payment is, after all, virtually always an integral part of commercial or
financial transactions.
It is however open to argument that the reasoning in Bowmakers Ltd v Barnet Instruments Ltd [1945]
KB 65 may avail the beneficiary in such a position. It might be possible for him to plead his claim for
payment not on the illegality but on some other legal interest. Clarke J in Group Josi, for example,
relied on this as a possible ground to permit the enforcement of the letter of credit; the judge found
that the fact that opening the letter of credit amounted to effecting conditional payment under the
reinsurances bymeans of a separate contractual engagement between the bank and the reassureds,
and as such a conditional payment was not rendered illegal by the Insurance Companies Acts. The
applicability of that reasoning was rejected by Staughton LJ in the Court of Appeal and as far as the
present case was concerned, Colman J too thought that the separate nature of the letter of credit
could notbeused to trump thepublic policy that thebeneficiary should notbenefit fromhis illegality.
The court also confirmed that Waller LJ's guidance in Balfour Beatty Civil Engineering vTechnical &
General Guarantee Co Ltd (1999) 68 Con LR 180 on the issue of the quantum of proof was
applicable to the present circumstances. It may be recalled that in that case that the following test
was laid down:
(a) When the demand was made under the demand bond [or letter of credit], did the surety or the
bank have clear evidence from which the only inference to be drawn was fraud [illegality]? If the
answer was no, prima facie the beneficiary was entitled to judgment.
(b) What, on the information available at the time of the application for summary judgment, was the
strength of the surety's case that the demandwas fraudulent [for an illegal purpose]?
ö If the evidence was now clear, then no judgment would be given in favour of the beneficiary
because of the fact that the surety [bank] would be entitled to a judgment of the equivalent
sum.
ö If the evidence was powerful but not quite sufficient to enable summary judgment to be en-
tered in favour of the surety on the basis that the demand was fraudulent [or founded on an
illegal purpose], then either judgmentwouldbe enteredwith a stayof execution or probably no
judgmentwouldbe entered at all untilwhatwas in effect the counterclaimhadbeen foughtout
at trial.
520 JIML 9 [2003] 6 : ANALYSIS ANDCOMMENT
ö If the evidencewas less than powerful, judgmentwould be entered in favour of the beneficiary
and the surety wouldbe left either to pursuehis remedy against the applicantor pursue a claim
or counterclaim for reimbursement formonies paid if it subsequently transpired that therewas
indeed fraud [an illegal purpose].
In case itmightbe thought that thepresentcasemakes iteasy for banks toplead illegality, it shouldbe
noted that these guidelines (which are not entirely free from controversy) mean that the bank will
need to show that it has c`lear evidence'of illegality.This is not easily established, especially where the
illegality is one under some arcane foreign law.
The judgment is very much grounded on public policy but policy can sometimes be a blunt
instrument. For example, how should a court deal with the validity and enforceability of a letter of
creditwhere theunderlying transaction is illegalbut that illegality is amere technicalmisdemeanour?
On this issue,Colman J commented:
There ismuch to be said for the view that the public policy in superseding the impregnability of letters
of credit where there is an unlawful underlying transaction defence may not be engaged where the
nature of underlying illegal purpose is relatively trivial, at least where the purpose is to be
accomplished in a foreign jurisdiction.
Such a qualitative assessment of what is trivial is difficult ^ should the triviality be evaluated from
English eyes or under foreign law or both? How is such an assessment of gravity to be approached
given the principle of international judicial comity?
An addendum.Colman J's judgmentdoesnot setout in anydetail therespective arguments of counsel.
Although it was justified on the need to keep the judgment to ``manageable proportions in the time
available'', it would have been interesting to see how counsel for the beneficiary developed the
reasoning in Bowmakers.
JC
OIL POLLUTION ^ CONTRACT REGARDING AN INTERIM SUPPLEMENT TO
TANKER LIABILITY FOR OIL POLLUTION (CRISTAL) ^
EXCLUSIONS ^ POLLUTION DAMAGE
Caribbean Petroleum Corporation and General Electrical Capital Business Asset Funding
Corporation v Cristal Ltd (The Morris J Berman)
[2003] EWHC 2357 (Comm) English Commercial Court
Facts
Shortly after theMorris J Berman, a tank barge, sailed from San Juan in tow of the tug Emily Swith a
cargo of 1.47 million gallons of No. 6 fuel oil, the towline parted and the barge grounded on a coral
reef. 800,000 gallons of her cargo were spilled, posing a threat of further pollution by the oil
remaining on board. The Morris J Berman was owned and operated by the Bunker Group and was
voyage chartered to the first claimants,Caribbean Petroleum Corporation (CPC), a member of the
defendants (Cristal), whichwas also the owner of the oil on board.The owner of the tug wasMetlife
Capital Corporation (Metlife), later known as General Electric Capital Business Asset Funding
Corporation, a financial institution which held the title to the tug by way of security for finance
provided to the Bunker Group, to whom it had bareboat chartered the tug.The Bunker Group was
insured for pollution liabilities up toUS$10million.The limiton this coverwasreachedafter eightdays
and the US Government organised the clean-up thereafter through the medium of the US
Coastguard. To this end, contracts for clean-up work were entered into between the US
Coastguard and independent contractors. The liability of the US Coastguard arising out of these
contracts was discharged by the United States Oil Spill LiabilityTrust Fund ( t`he US fund').
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